Review

Previously published by Damaris Culture Watch.

On the Side of the Angels
Part two of a three-part review of Richard Dawkins’ A Devil’s Chaplain
Peter S. Williams responds to A Devil’s Chaplain: selected essays by Richard Dawkins,
Latha Menon (ed.), (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003)

Part Two: Good and Bad Reasons for Believing

In an open letter written to his daughter Juliet on her tenth birthday and published as the last entry in A Devil’s Chaplain, ‘Good and Bad Reasons for Believing’, Richard Dawkins encourages her to reject ‘three bad reasons for believing anything’ [1] , namely tradition, authority and revelation; and encourages her to think for herself by only accepting beliefs supported by evidence.

There are two points made by Dawkins that I would like to affirm before turning my critical attention to his other assertions. The first is the implicit point that thinking for oneself is a good thing, whereas blind faith is a bad thing. The second point is that mutually contradictory views cannot both be true: ‘it can’t be true that different religions are right in their own countries, because different religions claim that opposite things are true.’ [2] Quite right. For example, metaphysical naturalism claims that there is no supernatural reality, that everything can therefore be explained (at least in principle) naturalistically, and that if something cannot be explained naturalistically (e.g. a miracle), then it cannot be true – believing such a thing must depend upon the dogmatic and blind faith of unfounded religious ‘tradition’, illegitimate ‘authority’, or subjective ‘revelation’. Christianity, on the other hand, claims that there are supernatural realities (e.g. God), and that not everything can be explained naturalistically (e.g. miracles), and that if something cannot be explained naturalistically, then it might nevertheless be true – whether or not we should believe it depends upon the evidence. Ruling out supernatural explanations a priori, Christians point out, depends upon faith in the philosophical dogma of naturalism. Both views can’t be right; so which view is true, and how can we know?

How Many Ways Do I Know Thee?

‘Have you ever wondered how we know the things that we know?’ [3] , asks Dawkins. The answer, he says (and he does seem to mean the answer), is ‘evidence.’ [4] There are several obvious problems with this piece of fatherly advice. It artificially restricts the basis of knowledge in a self-defeating manner. What evidence has Richard Dawkins got to show that the only way in which we know things is through the gathering of evidence? If he hasn’t got any, then he is in trouble. But Dawkins’ criteria for knowing is a philosophical rule that, as such, would appear to be in principle unsupportable by evidence. If he thinks he does have some evidence for this claim, then we can justifiably ask what evidence he has that this evidence is good evidence, or that this evidence really supports the conclusion he draws from it, and so on, ad infinitum. In other words, the absolute requirement for evidence leads to an evidentially vicious regress of evidences that undermines the worth of all evidence, since no evidence would ultimately count as something known. There must be more to knowing that ‘evidence’.

For example, do you know what you are looking at right now? How do you know? You might produce evidence for the truth of your belief about what you are now looking at, but before I asked you this question, your belief didn’t actually rest on any such process of reasoning from evidence to a conclusion. Instead, you simply find yourself with a certain belief about what was in front of you: ‘We don’t perceive a tree and then engage in reasoning or weighing evidence in order to draw the conclusion that there’s a tree before us. Under normal conditions seeing the tree triggers our belief-forming faculties, which produce in us the belief that a tree is there.’ [5] We just know, as a part of our present experience, rather than as the result of a chain of reasoning, what is in front of us. Generally speaking, experience isn’t evidence for our beliefs but part and parcel of our beliefs. As Professor of philosophy Roy Clouser reminds us: ‘Proving is actually an inferior way of coming to know something, a way we resort to when we can’t directly experience what we want to know.’ [6]

Indeed, there are things that we are perfectly justified in believing but which it is actually impossible to prove with evidence or reason. For example, one cannot prove the logical law of non-contradiction because any attempt at a proof would beg-the-question.

Dawkins is adamant that: ‘Scientists [are] the specialists in discovering what is true about the world and the universe ...’ [7] This is yet a another self-defeating scientistic assertion that leaves no room for philosophy, let alone theology, and has profound implications for his worldview conclusions.

Questioning Tradition

Richard Dawkins defines tradition as ‘beliefs handed down from grandparent to parent to child, and so on,’ [8] and asserts that, ‘Traditional beliefs often start from almost nothing; perhaps somebody just makes them up originally.’ [9] Since Dawkins has religious tradition in his sights, it is worth asking what evidence he has for such an assertion in relation, say, to Christianity. Dawkins mentions Christian beliefs such as that ‘Jesus never had a human father, belief that prayers are answered’ [10] , etc. But he doesn’t provide any evidence that these beliefs don’t have any evidential support (in fact, they do [11] ), or are irrational. Dawkins’ attack on religious tradition assumes that all such traditions are essentially ‘made up’ [12] , being the mere passing on of unsubstantiated stories that accumulate a firmer cultural status the older they get. But such a view of tradition singularly fails to fit such religious traditions as the belief that Jesus rose from the grave – a belief that was grounded in the historical experience of many witnesses and for which the first generation of believers was immediately willing to die.

Richard Dawkins suggests that people believe religious doctrines ‘because they were told to believe them when they were young enough to believe anything.’ [13] One feels like asking, ‘How old would that be? Would ten years old be young enough?’ Of course children generally believe things that they are told when they are young – but not all children who are taught the Christian tradition grow up as believers; and not all believers were taught the Christian tradition as children. Dawkins’ comments fail to take adult converts into account.

Dawkins comments that different branches of the Christian religious tradition ‘all believe different things’ [14] and warns that ‘People who believe even slightly different things from each other often go to war over their disagreements. So you might think that they must have some pretty good reasons – evidence – for believing what they believe. But actually their different beliefs are entirely due to different traditions.’ [15] I have four things to say in response:

1) A recent comparison of the creedal statements of every major branch of Christianity showed that they agree on 98.5 percent of their teaching. [16]

2) Atheists are hardly immune from disagreements, or from going to war with people who disagree with them.

3) Dawkins conflates having reasons with having evidence. They are not the same thing.

4) Dawkins incorrectly implies that religious traditions never have anything to do with evidence (or reason).

Questioning Authority

Richard Dawkins says that authority, as a reason for believing something, ‘means believing it because you are told to believe it by somebody important.’ [17] What this definition leaves out is the stipulation that an authority be somebody ‘important’ with reference to the thing they are recommending to your belief. We are generally right to trust doctors about matters of health because doctors know more about health than we do. The same goes for scientists. The same goes for philosophers. And the same goes for theologians and bible-teachers. When Dawkins says that ‘There is no good reason why, just because he is the Pope, you should believe everything he said, any more than you believe everything that lots of other people say’ [18] , he is, I think, unfairly misrepresenting Catholics. It is as if Dawkins were to comment: ‘There is no good reason why, just because I am a scientist, you should believe everything I say, any more than you believe everything that lots of other people say.’ Well of course not; but just as this assertion is obvious, so aiming a similar assertion against Catholics as if they would be silly enough to disagree with it, is simply to attack a ‘straw man’.

I’m sure that Catholics no more believe everything the Pope says, or do so just because he is the Pope, than naturalists believe everything Dawkins says, or do so just because he is a well-known scientist. The real question is whether or not there is anything real that the Pope might be in an authoritative position to know about. Catholics will think so, and many will think so for various reasons that could be articulated if the need arose. Dawkins would disagree. One imagines that a rather fruitless discussion could ensue. But the crucial point to note is that such a discussion would be about whether or not various supposed reasons and evidences were good reasons and evidences. It wouldn’t be a discussion about why Catholics are so stupid that they gullibly believe everything that the Pope says simply because he is ‘somebody important’.

Questioning Revelation

Richard Dawkins says that ‘When religious people just have a feeling inside themselves that something must be true, even though there is no evidence that it is true, they call their feeling “revelation”.’ [19] On this definition of revelation, Dawkins’ belief that the only way to know things is through evidence may well count as a revelation (after all, he can’t have any evidence for it); and hence, according to Dawkins’ own advice, as a bad reason for believing anything.

Dawkins writes as if he has never believed anything, never thought he knew something, simply because he has a feeling inside himself that something must be true. Are we really to believe that Dawkins is a man wholly without intuition and gut feelings?

For Christian theology, revelation can, it is true, mean a private revelation – an individual religious experience in which God is taken to be imparting knowledge. But it can also mean a public revelation, such as a miracle. In either case, revelation can involve publicly knowable and testable evidence (e.g. the historical evidence for Jesus’ resurrection). Dawkins mentions the ‘belief that prayers are answered’ [20] , under the rubric of tradition – but answered prayer can surely constitute a revelation of God’s concern, even of His existence. Prayer for healing is becoming the subject of serious scientific study. [21] For example:

Dr [Randolf] Byrd divided 393 heart patients into two groups. One was prayed for by Christians; the other did not receive prayers from study participants. Patients didn’t know which group they belonged to. The members of the group that was prayed for experienced fewer complications, fewer cases of pneumonia, fewer cardiac arrests, less congestive heart failure and needed fewer antibiotics. [22]

What Kind of Evidence is There For That?

Dawkins advises Juliet:

Next time somebody tells you something that sounds important, think to yourself: “Is this the kind of thing that people probably know because of evidence? Or is it the kind of thing that people only believe because of tradition, authority or revelation?” And next time somebody tells you that something is true, why not say to them: “What kind of evidence is there for that?” And if they can’t give you a good answer, I hope you’ll think very carefully before you believe a word they say. [23]

One might well question why the accumulated wisdom of a well-founded tradition (such as the scientific tradition), the authority of those rationally judged to be in a good position to speak authoritatively on this or that (such as a scientist speaking on matters of science), or the tenets of some particular revelation (such as the Christian scriptures) - if it is indeed an authoritative revelation — should not count as evidence, but should instead be wholly dismissed as ‘bad reasons for believing anything.’ [24] As we have seen, Dawkins circumscribes what can count as evidence so tightly – conflating evidence with empirical evidence – that his definition of knowledge ends up suffocating itself, because it cannot be justified with anything that it would count as evidence! With these points in mind we might proceed to take Dawkins’ advice by applying it to his own views.

When Dawkins promulgates the atheistic message that ‘God is dead’ because science ‘reveals a world without purpose or design’ (the subtitle to The Blind Watchmaker), he certainly says something that sounds important. So we should ask ourselves: Is this the kind of thing that Dawkins knows because of the evidence? Or is it the kind of thing that he only believes because of he stands in the atheistic tradition, and accepts the authority of fellow atheists like Charles Darwin and his scientific ‘revelation’ that the facts of biology somehow undermine belief in God and thereby belief in cosmic purpose? Why don’t we examine Dawkins’ views asking: ‘What kind of evidence (scientific and philosophical) is there for that?’ And if we don’t receive a good answer, we should think very carefully before we believe what he has to say.

The Sine Qua Non of Evolution: ‘What kind of evidence (scientific and philosophical) is the Evidence for that?’

Dawkins says: ‘[For evolution to occur] you need raw materials that can self-replicate ... The sine qua non [that without which] ... is self-replication.’ [25] The idea that the raw materials required for life could simply ‘arise’ from some ‘warm little pond’ of chemicals (as Darwin hypothesized) is known as abiogenesis, from the Greek a (without), bios (life) and ginomai (to form). The concept is popularly known today under the rubric of the hypothetical ‘primal soup’. The general concept of abiogenesis was held by ancient Greek thinkers such as Anaximander and Aristotle, and revived in the mid twentieth century when Stanley Miller and Harold Urey recreated in the laboratory what they believed to be an accurate representation of the early Earth’s atmosphere, managing to produce some amino-acids by passing an electric spark through their mixture of gases.

If the extrapolation from the Urey-Miller experiment to the viability of abiogenesis were sound, one could still ask: ‘What accounts for the existence of a “primal soup” with the correct “recipe” for life?’ The answer, as Dr. Benjamin Wiker points out, would track back to the finely-tuned laws of nature that characterize cosmic evolution, and hence, one could argue, track back to design: ‘Since biological evolution depends on stellar evolution – where else would all the necessary chemical elements to make those incredibly complex molecules come from? – the necessity of fine-tuning for biological evolution has already been proven. Even now, Darwinism cannot claim to be designer-free.’ [26] A finely tuned ‘primal soup’ suggests an intelligent ‘Primal Cook’! [27]

However, ‘Miller and Urey’s experiment only works as long as oxygen is absent and certain critical ratios of hydrogen and carbon dioxide are maintained.’ [28] , and scientists now think that oxygen was present in the early earth’s atmosphere: ‘the early atmosphere looked nothing like the Miller-Urey simulation.’ [29] Of course, if oxygen were not present, the molecules of life would have been unprotected from deadly ultraviolet radiation. Either way, abiogenesis is in trouble!

These problems aside, ‘The information filled molecules of life are much more complex and structured than previously thought’. [30] As Nobel Prize winning physiologist George Beadle reports, DNA ‘was believed by many to be a rather monotonous polymer built of four kinds of nucleotide units arranged in segments of four that were repeated manifold.’ [31] ‘At that time,’ says fellow Nobel winner Max Delbruck, ‘it was believed that DNA was a stupid substance.’ [32] However, we now know that DNA is very far from being a monotonous polymer, but is in fact an exceedingly complex and ‘clever’ substance. The amino acids generated by tightly controlled and unrealistic laboratory experiments are far less complex than the simplest protein molecules needed for life: ‘Miller’s optimism has now all but evaporated, as experiments based on his model have failed to produce a number of components essential to life.’ [33] Therefore, as Chemist Jonathan Sarfati writes, ‘the very roots of the alleged evolutionary tree are in very bad shape.’ [34]

So what is the basis of Dawkins’ confident belief in a naturalistic origin of self-replicating molecules? What kind of evidence is there for that? Dawkins can only offer the following:

‘Nobody knows how it happened but, somehow, without violating the laws of physics and chemistry, a molecule arose that just happened to have the property of self-copying – a replicator.’ [35]

This is at least a frank admission of ignorance. ‘I would have to be more of a chemist that I am to know how likely it is that you are going to get such molecules’, admits Dawkins, ‘I don’t know how difficult it would be to achieve that chemically.’ [36]

Stop to consider for a moment how significant it is that Professor Dawkins, who accuses the Christian religious tradition of believing things without evidence, and who exhorts the nation to always ask, ‘What kind of evidence is there for that?’ [37] , should believe in what he calls the ‘sine qua non’ of evolution without a shred of evidence. Dr. Benjamin Wiker comments that this ‘lapse into an irrational faith in the powers of chance to avoid an [intelligent design] inference ... is not evidence itself but a telling lapse into a materialist credo quia absurdum est.’ [38] That is, Dawkins’ justification for belief in abiogenesis has nothing to do with evidence and everything to do with his philosophical assumptions. Not only does naturalistic science lack an explanation of how abiogenesis is supposed to have happened, it actually lacks any scientific evidence that abiogenesis ‘just happened’! As Walter L. Bradley observes, ‘the origin of a sophisticated system that is both rich in information and capable of reproducing itself has absolutely stymied origin-of-life scientists.’ [39] That abiogenesis ‘just happened’, as Dawkins’ admissions of ignorance make clear, is a philosophical deduction entailed by the assumption of naturalism. As Dean L. Overman comments: ‘This is a good example of ... circular reasoning ... in which evidence is ignored in order to maintain a myth, and the conclusion is set forth in the premise.’ [40]

While theists and agnostics do of course have a healthy bias in favor of naturalistic explanations when these are adequate, they cannot treat such a circular deduction as the unquestionable and absolute certainty that it must be for Dawkins. Rather, they will be open to letting the evidence decide the question. So just how big a ‘just happened’ chance is Dawkins’ blind faith in naturalistic abiogenesis required to support? Philosopher of science Stephen C. Meyer calculates that, ‘the probability of constructing a rather short functional protein at random [is] so small as to be effectively zero ... ’ [41] In other words, not only does naturalistic science lack an explanation of how the chemistry of life arose, or sufficient evidence to show that abiogenesis ‘just happened’, it also flies in the face of scientific evidence that it didn’t ‘just’ happen! As biochemist Klaus Dose admits: ‘More than thirty years of experimentation on the origin of life in the fields of chemical and molecular evolution have led to a better perception of the immensity of the problem of the origin of life on Earth rather than to its solution.’ [42]

Dawkins freely admits that the chance origin of life theory ‘may seem like a big stroke of luck’, [43] but he seeks to mitigate against this admission by saying ‘it had to happen only once ... it may have happened on only one planet out of a billion billion planets in the universe.’ [44] But this is merely optimistic hand waving. For one thing, ‘it is unlikely that there are many, if any, other earth-like planets in the universe’ [45] able to sustain life. Benjamin Wiker relates some of the finely tuned conditions that permit life on earth:

Our sun is not a typical star but is one of the 9 percent most massive stars in our galaxy, and is also very stable. Further, the sun hits the Goldilocks mean for life – neither too hot (like a blue or white star) nor too cold (like a red star) – and its peak emission is right at the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum – the very, very thin band where not only vision is possible but also photosynthesis. Earth just “happens” to have the right combination of atmospheric gases to block out almost all the harmful radiation on the electromagnetic spectrum but, strangely enough, opens like a window for visible light. Jupiter is deftly placed and sized so that it not only helps to balance the Earth’s orbit but also acts as a kind of debris magnet keeping Earth from being pummeled. Our moon is just the right size and distance to stabilize earth’s axial tilt so that we have seasonal variations but not wildly swinging temperature changes. [46]

Astronomer Hugh Ross lists 200 anthropic parameters required for a life-bearing planet. Comparing the chances of a planet falling within these parameters by chance alone with our best estimate of the total number of planets in the universe (10²²) he estimates that there is ‘less than 1 chance in 10²¹⁵’ of even one habitable planet existing in the universe ‘without invoking divine miracles.’ [47]

For another thing, to generate a single functional protein of only 150 amino acids exceeds ‘1 chance in 10¹⁸⁰ ... In other words, given the complexity of proteins, it is extremely unlikely that a random search through all the possible amino acid sequences could generate even a single relatively short functional protein in the time available since the beginning of the universe ... ’ [48] Dawkins may say that, ‘Given enough time, anything is possible.’ [49] But there simply isn’t enough time available to sustain the plausibility of abiogenesis. Professor of Mathematics at Cardiff University, Chandra Wickramasinghe, concludes that: ‘Living systems could not have been generated by random processes, within a finite time-scale, in a finite universe.’ [50] (Besides which, as philosopher Keith Ward has pointed out, the assumption that ‘given enough time anything that can happen will happen’ is simply a logical fallacy: ‘There is no reason why, if there are n possible states, they should all come into existence one after another, or at some time.’ [51] )  Hence, as Walter L. Bradley says, ‘Today it takes a great deal of faith to be an honest scientist who is an atheist.’ [52]

Dawkins’ blithe, hand waving ignorance of the evidence against abiogenesis surely shows, as Michael J. Behe comments, ‘the need to treat Darwinian scenarios ... with a hermeneutic of suspicion.’ [53] For as Michael Behe observes: ‘Some scientists believe so strongly in Darwinism that their critical judgments are affected, and they will unconsciously overlook pretty obvious problems with Darwinian scenarios, or confidently assert things which are objectively untrue.’ [54]

Conclusion

In ‘Good and Bad Reasons for Believing’, Richard Dawkins employs a self-defeating definition of knowledge to attack self-serving, ‘straw man’ definitions of tradition, authority and revelation. When it comes to Dawkins’ belief in what he calls the sine qua non of evolution, abiogenesis, we find him in clear violation of his own advice about the importance of evidence. Abiogenesis is a legitimate philosophical deduction from the assumption of metaphysical naturalism. But it is not a sound scientific induction from the available empirical evidence. Indeed, the naturalistic dogma of abiogenesis is falsified by the scientific evidence. Abiogenesis is something Dawkins believes in spite of the evidence, because he accepts the authority of the naturalistic tradition; he certainly can’t accept the authority of the naturalistic tradition because of the evidence for abiogenesis.

By way of contrast, I submit that Christians can accept the authority of the Christian tradition precisely because of the available evidence. To take a prime example, the resurrection of Jesus is not something Christians believe without any evidence, or in spite of the evidence, but because of the evidence (both historical and experiential). G. K. Chesterton mused how the extraordinary idea had arisen that people who don’t believe in miracles consider them coldly and fairly, while believers accept them only because they believe some unfounded ‘tradition’. He said that quite the reverse is true. The believer in miracles accepts them (rightly or wrongly) because they have evidence for them, while the disbelievers in miracles deny them (rightly or wrongly) because they have a doctrine against them. In spite of the evidence, Dawkins rejects the virgin birth, answered prayer and, no doubt, the resurrection of Christ, because he has a dogma (naturalism) against such things. He accepts the naturalistic ‘miracle’ of abiogenesis, in spite of the evidence, because the same dogma requires it. [55]

Recommended Resources

Evidence & Epistemology

James Kelly Clark, ‘Without Evidence or Argument – a Defence of Reformed Epistemology’ @
www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/new/sohang/articles/clark_kelly_j/without_evidence_or_argument.pdf

Peter van Inwagen, ‘Is It Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?’ @
http://comp.uark.edu/~senor/wrong.html

Alvin Plantinga, ‘Theism, Atheism and Rationality’ @ www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth02.html

Alvin Plantinga, ‘Intellectual Sophistication and Basic Belief in God’ @www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth03.html

The Virgin Birth Lee Strobel interviews William Lane Craig, ‘Since Miracles Contradict Science, They Cannot be True’, @
www.theapologiaproject.org/contradict.html

‘The Virgin Birth of Christ: Evidence of its Historicity’ @ www.themoorings.org/apologetics/VirginBirth/evid.html

Prayer Richard Deem, ‘Scientific Evidence for Answered Prayer’ @ www.evidence.info/answers/prayer.html

Theodore J. Chamberlain & Christopher A. Hall, Realized Religion (London: Templeton Foundation Press, 2000)

Abiogenesis and the Origins of Life Hugh Ross, ‘Fine Tuning of Physical Life Support Body’ @
www.reasons.org/resources/apologetics/design_evidences/20020502_solar_system_design.shtml?main

Hugh Ross, ‘Probability for a Life Support Body’ @ www.reasons.org/resources/apologetics/design_evidences/20020502_life_support_body_prob.shtml?main

‘Rare Earth Debate Part I’ @ http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/rare_earth_1_020715.html

Dean L. Overman, A Case Against Accident and Self-Organization, (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997)

Jonathan Wells, Icons of Evolution, (Regnery Publishing, 2000)

Jesus’ Resurrection William Lane Craig @ www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/index.html

Hear Craig debate Brian Edwards, ‘Did the Resurrection Really Happen?’ @ www.gospelcom.net/rzim/radio/easter.shtml (mp3 File)

Shandon L. Guthrie, ‘Evidence For The Resurrection Of Jesus’ @ http://sguthrie.net/resurrection.htm

Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, ‘Evidence for the Resurrection of Christ’ @ http://hometown.aol.com/philvaz/articles/num9.htm

Josh McDowell, ‘Evidence for the Resurrection’ @ www.leaderu.com/everystudent/easter/articles/josh2.html

Ross Clifford, The Case for the Empty Tomb: Leading Lawyers Look at the Resurrection, (Oxford, Lion/Albatross, 1993)

Paul Copan (ed.), Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up? A Debate between William Lane Craig and John Dominic Crossan, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1998)

Paul Copan and Ronald Tacelli (ed.’s), Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? A Debate between William Lane Craig & Gerd Ludemann, (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP, 2000)

William Lane Craig, The Son Rises: The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus, (Chicago, Illinois: Moody Press, 1981)

Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection, (London: SPCK, 1993)

Gary R. Habermas and J.P. Moreland, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality, (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 1998)

Gary R. Habermas and R. Douglas Geivett (ed.), In Defence of Miracles, (Leicester: Apollos, 1997)

Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics, (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP, 1994)

J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1987)

Lee Strobel, The Case for Christ, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1998)

Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate, (Oxford, 2002)

Peter Walker, The Weekend that Changed the World: The Mystery of Jerusalem’s Empty Tomb, (London: Marshall Pickering, 1999)

John Wenham, Easter Enigma, (London: Paternoster Press, 1992²)

Michael J. Wilkins and J.P. Moreland (ed.’s), Jesus Under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents the Historical Jesus, (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996)

Copyright © 2003 Peter S. Williams. All rights reserved. International copyright secured.
File Date: 11.21.03